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Book Reviews
The Critical Legal Studies Movement. By Roberto Mangabeira
Unger. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1986.
128 pages. Cloth, $17.95. Paper $7.95.

reviewed by Jeremy M. Miller*
Even after reading Roberto Mangabeira Unger's most recent
book, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, the genesis and purpose of that movement remain perplexing and unclear. I have come
to conclude that its birth lay buried in the clouded inaccessible
recesses of Professor Unger's mind; and its purpose, unfortunately,
to be mired in a simplistic "yuppie" Marxism.
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) was the brainchild of Professor Unger and other Harvard Law School professors like Duncan Kennedy. It took name and notoriety about a decade ago. For a relatively new school of thought, it has gained much press. Most of
this press, however, has been due to the furor it has caused on the
Harvard law faculty: the proponents of CLS have, correctly or incorrectly, been accused of purposely disrupting the venerable halls
of the crimson academy. Most impressive in the brief history of
this school of jurisprudence has been its ability to attract other law
professors into its fold. Further, since the national press has covered the "crisis at Harvard," CLS has become a household word.
In the Introduction, Unger lets us know the political perspective
of CLS . . it is a "leftist" movement,' the aim of which is to undermine "the central ideas of modern legal thought." 2 An overriding belief in "formalism" and "objectivism," according to Unger,
characterizes all present legal thought. By formalism is meant the
* Professor, Western State University College of Law. B.A. Yale, J.D. Tulane, LL.M.
University of Pennsylvania.
1. R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 1 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Unger].
2. Id.

537

538

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 25:537

belief that law is a system of all-inclusive rules. That is, that to
any given legal query, there is a clear answer in the existing set of
laws. Implicit in formalism is a legal analytic method whereby the
"right" answer can be logically deduced from existing law. Thus,
law as such is a closed system, isolated from the other facets of
human and societal existence.
Unger defines objectivism as the belief that law is "intelligible" 3
and representative of a "moral" ordering process. 4 Objectivism includes the beliefs in legal rules and legal institutions.' To Unger,
however, both the belief in formalism and the belief in objectivism
of law are sham concepts. Law is instead the means by which the
power elite have amassed their power to the exclusion of all others.
Unger wishes to use law to "redefine the meaning of radicalism"
and to take power away from the present unjust ruling class.' This
7
is, of course, a derivation of Marxism.
The jurisprudential predecessors of CLS spring from Marx, just
cited, and to a lesser degree, from the early 1900's school of legal
thought, American Realism. Central to Marx's thought was a belief
in the arbitrary quality of law: law was the means by which one
class stayed in power over another. Also central to Marxist thought
was the desire to destroy the present hierarchies in society thereby
'8
to create pure "egalitarianism."
American Realism, whose proponents have included Associate
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Judge Jerome Frank, viewed
the written law as but a small aspect of the real workings of the
legal system. Law, instead of being a set of rules, was rather, simply, what or whatever the judge said it was.9
Unger has completely accepted the above cited Marxist and Realist tenets and has devoted a substantial part of this short book to
proving their veracity. He characterizes the jurists of the nineteenth century as apologists of the free market. That is, the system
of rules they devised, particularly contract rules,10 was created to
protect the world as it was-or specifically, to protect big business.
It is this system which CLS means to destroy. According to Unger,
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 10, 98.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id. at 121.
8. See generally K. MARX AND F. ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST
1964) [hereinafter cited as Marx].
9. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949).
10. Unger, supra note 1, at 58-80.
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the system is vulnerable because there is no unifying ideal to give
direction to its supposed objectivism.
However, as stated earlier, Unger is not a pure Marxist. He does
not believe in a violent revolution or even in an uprising of the
"afflicted masses." His method is more subtle. Since lawyers control the power structure and since what lawyers call "law" becomes
law, the best way to change the system is by changing the lawyers.
Unger perceives a problem with this: law school teaches a moral
anesthesia and the sophist skill of being able to argue (and perhaps
believe) "too well or too easily for too many conflicting
solutions.""
Thus, the present world of law is basically lost. However, future
lawyers can be remolded. The obvious agenda of CLS is to inculcate law students not with the joys of power, but instead with the
CLS system of beliefs. 12 These beliefs include a destruction of present economic power bases, a leveling of all social hierarchies, and
a Marxist renunciation of the concept of law. 3
Unger is willing to see his plan come to fruition in steps. Thus,
he suggests the development of a set of legal concepts called
"destabilization rights."" These are nothing more than laws which
allow the existing power bases to be attacked. He classifies equal
protection and employment discrimination laws as such. To further this economic decentralization, Unger also suggests that government make large sums of money available to small business.' 5
I have several criticisms of Professor Unger's thought. Although
it is now axiomatic that law is more than a system of written rules,
it is troubling that Unger perceives no worthy human values behind the rules. His dislike of values is made clear by his admission
that he views law as quasi-existentialist." That is, law is not a
good thing, but instead is a primarily negative concept.
Such nihilism can only undercut the worthwhile protections in
our society. The freedoms of the press, of speech, of religion, and
of association, and the other human guarantees of the Bill of
Rights lose all force and all meaning in Unger's system. Further,
the great legal values of dignity, fairness, liberty, et cetera, also
have no place in his "law." I fear a CLS-based legal system because
11. Id. at 8.
12. Id. at 112-13, 118.
13. Id. at 25-27.
14. Id. at 43.
15. Id. at 35.
16. Id. at 103-04.
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it seems they do not believe in even freedom of expression.'7
I hardly consider Judge Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of
Law,"8 Professor Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously, 9 or
even my own view as an apology for the United States system.
However, Unger has made it clear that in his view all those not
with CLS are apologists for the present power structure. This kind
of argument is a sophistry. Lumping together all of those who opand isper se unsatisfactory criticism.
pose you is called "heaps
Posner's economic analysis believes law should promote maximization of societal wealth by maximizing efficiency. Dworkin's
rights thesis argues that even "costly" human rights like equality
are implicit and should be promoted in law. These two systems are
very different-yet to Unger since they are not his system, they are
the same. This kind of radicalism is intellectually silly-but becomes dangerous if naively accepted.
I am further troubled by Unger's deprecation of the existing
United States court system as being concerned with only trivialities.2' For whatever mistakes courts might make, their dealings
with life, confinement, death, reputation, and large sums of personal wealth are not trivial. This frenzied out-of-touch radicalism
of Unger is perhaps best typified by his concluding paragraph,
where he describes present United States law, law practioners, and
law teachers: "When we came, they were like a priesthood that had
lost their faith and kept their jobs. They stood in tedious embarrassment before cold altars. But we turned away from those altars
and found the mind's opportunity in the heart's revenge. ' 22 This
frenzied call for change, which I would characterize as "intellectual
terrorism," is reminiscent of closing words in other radical
writings.2 s
17. Freedom of expression is not one of Unger's emphasized platforms. Further, the
reported behavior of the CLS proponents at Harvard indicates a disrespect for this value.
Finally, the world's existing Marxist countries are characterized by a lack of freedom of
expression.
18. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
19. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
20. See R. FOGELIN, UNDERSTANDING ARGUMENTS 77 (1978).
21. See Unger, supra note 1, at 19-20.
22. Id. at 119.
23. Unger's words are reminiscent in tone of the following:
The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that
their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians
have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.
Working men of all countries, unite!
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In explicable naivete, Unger has failed to cognize the history of
human government. There will be no classless egalitarian society.
The choice is instead between big government and Jeffersonian republicanism. Unger's system, if it ever gains proponents, will not
lead to a utopia, but instead to one more form of totalitarianism.
Further, the CLS desire to destroy all hierarchies is not only untenable but also damaging. Although certain hierarchies are wrong
and unfair, other hierarchies-those based on merit-are essential
to worthwhile human society. The flaw of any absolute egalitarianism, and Unger's is one,24 is that it chokes off all liberty. Further,
there is nothing wrong with respect for elders, with respect for
those in honored positions, and with respect for law.
I am also troubled by Unger's hypocritical view that law is "a
realm from which prophets and plain people are banned so that
power may be wielded in a hush."2 5 Although Unger is partly correct in that all lawyers must make it their primary project to teach
law to all United States citizens, he is hypocritical because his own
writing is either purposely or negligently drafted so as to bar reading to all but those trained in the law. His linguistic obfuscations
are prevalent and may fairly be called "doublespeak." For example, his vocabulary includes the following terms: "deviationist, ''2 6
"collective mobilization, '27 "collective life,"218 and "social transformation. '29 Such can be approximately translated as revolutionary
thought, revolution, communism, and evolution to communism, respectively. Moreover, the book is such difficult reading that its
ideas, far more than present United States law, are what is truly in
"a hush."
It is certain that corporate greed and government corruption and
bureaucracy are grievous errors in the United States legal system.
However, Unger's and CLS' impish ignorance of the great virtues
of this system is unforgivable. In a rather dull era, I can only
surmise that CLS has gained its notoriety not so much as a good
idea, but instead as an interesting one. I earlier characterized its
form of Marxism as "yuppie" because, like that new movement, it
means to appeal not to the common person, but instead to the "goMarx, supra note 8, at 116.
24. See generally Unger, supra note 1, at 38.
25. Id. at 91.
26. Id. at 85.
27. Id. at 110.
28. Id. at 113.
29. Id. at 22.
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go" lawyer. It has found its home in the walls of Harvard and Unger admitted his basic audience to be that kind of elite law student. I hope they listen, evaluate, and are critical . . .as he has
been critical.

Ethics and the Legal Profession. Edited by Michael
Davis and Frederick A. Elliston. Buffalo, New York:
Prometheus Books. 1986. 495 pages.
reviewed by Mark D. Yochum*
The Potomac is an estuary; when the ocean rises, Chesapeake
Bay backs up the Potomac and water pools by Washington. Rivers
wash; estuaries slosh, back and forth. In Washington, some of the
dirt always stays in the Tidal Basin. Nearby is the Watergate, hard
by a foggy bottom, where the air is not always clear and the smell,
not always clean. For over a decade, Watergate, the phrase, the
event, the place, has been used as a symbol for what is wrong with
lawyers, the sense of something rotting. For the modern hopeful
student and lawyer, I recommend Ethics and the Legal Profession,
edited by Davis and Elliston, for an education in the finer sense of
ethics.
For many lawyers who consider themselves good, Watergate's invocation still causes chagrin. Because of it, we are lumped in jokes
with sharks, thieves, and used car salesmen. Because of it, young
people shun our profession because they search for honest work.
While Watergate still challenges the profession, lawyers themselves grow foggy discussing their ethics. Lawyers, while adept at
dealing in shadings of meaning, shift uncomfortably when there is
not a case or rule, some solid verity to which to cling. The haze is a
vagueness of feeling, the belief that some things are right, wrong,
good, or bad but the inability to express clearly or derive logically
what those things might be. This clammy doubt is not necessarily
about right and good for their private selves but rather about
themselves acting in that special role as lawyer, selfless servant to a
client yet obliged in some fashion to serve us all. When, however,
self, society, and the client present a conflicting array of judgments
and objectives, the air thickens. A sense of loss leads lawyers to
hallucinate harbors where there are none or to drift further away
from the truth, through use of metaphor and aphorism. Another
* Associate Professor, Duquesne University School of Law.
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course had been often taken: do not discuss 'ethics at all; steer
clear. Be detached.
The legal profession's once placid disregard of ethics or detachment from moral or ethical issues was disturbed by the "wake of
Watergate." This nautical metaphor anchors much of the last decade's frothings over the lawyer and his professional responsibility.
The dark wave of Watergate passed through the profession, chastening us to consider the good and the right, to resolve firmly to
sin no more, and to endeavor to make our brothers and new initiates likewise sinless. It is virtually impossible to find any writing in
the last ten years that does not use some variant of the articulation
that Watergate is the catalyst to modern ethical analysis by
lawyers.
An historian of the law may in later years evaluate whether, in
fact, Watergate itself generated this outpouring of ethical concern.
Certainly, the altruistic may have been shocked that so many lawyers, including the President, participated in crimes, if not heinous, at least disrespectful to our law and system. But many of us
knew that lawyers could be that bad; some of us thought that what
they did was not so bad; further, some of us thought that the bad
they did was because of the people they were, not because they
were lawyers.
Davis and Elliston, in their collection of articles from a variety
of sources (with discussion problems of their own added), Ethics
and the Legal Profession, hearken to Watergate. This collection is
designed for classroom use to provide counterpoint and fullness to
the idea of the ethical lawyer. The educational arm of the complex
legal institution of the United States, one would hope the more
thoughtful branch, responded to Watergate reflexively, approaching the problem as it might remedy a perceived deficiency in competency in a substantive area of law. Using Watergate as the focusing event, the issue became what problem to the profession does it
present? Why are these lawyers (high priced with the highest
placed of clients in the highest positions, both client and lawyer, of
public trust) not acting ethically or with trustworthiness? Two
possible answers were given short shrift by legal education. First,
possibly, these lawyers were bad people. If so, there is nothing that
we, the educators for the profession, can do to protect against aberrant conduct; there will always be criminals and consigliori. Second, possibly, legal education and practice itself produces an atmosphere which encourages moral and ethical detachment from, at
least, one's own judgment and submission to a client oriented de-
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votion. The way law is practiced, a lawyer can become corrupt if
his client is corrupt. By definition, the profession must say that
cannot be so. The law is good; the legal system is good. Fundamental, if not revolutionary, changes would be required in the legal
system and our view of law if what are commonly thought of as the
virtues of the lawyer actually compound evil.
Rather than reexamining the responses to the question of why
these lawyers were bad, the legal community viewed more seriously
the problem of a growing lack of confidence in the profession.
Watergate produced a decline in public trust and respect in the
lawyer which was the result of unethical activity brought brightly
to national attention. Public trust in the profession is essential to
the success of the profession's role in society, counselor and cotrustee with the courts of the grail of justice. No one will believe
our counsel; no one will believe we seek justice. Why then are the
lawyers not acting with professional responsibility: because (here is
the reflexive response of legal education) they do not know what
ethics are; we, the law schools, will volunteer to teach them.
All ABA accredited institutions have courses now, often required, of one or more credits, titled Professional Responsibility or
Ethics. Without empirical study one can but guess the content but
those who have endured a post-Watergate course may find this
description familiar. The course is taught by a lawyer whose principal text is a casebook and the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Model Rules. He is often adjunct to the school's main
faculty, often a litigator by trade or a jurist. The tone taken here is
not to suggest the litigator or jurist should not be engaged in this
task but merely to illustrate that when ethical problems are discussed they are most frequently given a litigation context. The lying witness, the guilty defendant, the meritorious but vexatious
suit, pleading technical defenses to just debts, and the client who
plans criminal activity are the regular stock in trade of the course.
Properly, taking this view, litigators do have more facility or experience in these questions than, for example, an average academic
with a Property bent or a quirk for Administrative Law. The Socratic and case study methods are often employed. There is an examination involving, in large measure, as most law school examinations do, questions asking what one can and cannot do without risk
of sanction.
Further, licensing institutions, the state bar examiners, part of
the legal education institution (we test what you teach; we teach
what you test), often test ethics, more so now than before the wa-
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tershed of Watergate. Again, the question asked is often answerable through reference in the law school manner to a code with proscriptions. My education was at Georgetown University Law
Center, a fine school, which also produced John Dean. If Dean and
I had had to be educated in ethics in pre-Watergate days along the
lines employed above and tested accordingly (we were not so required), I am sure we both would have been licensed to practice
and if grades were given, as a guess, I would say he would do better
than I.
Again, without an opinion survey to study, my judgment is mere
speculation but the course which I have described must lead to
some decline in enthusiasm for the subject. Often taught and taken
in the final days of legal education to students who may be growing
bored with academic statutory analysis and cases, Professional Responsibility, taught perhaps like some slightly heightened specialized course in crimes (only this time, crimes committed by lawyers), can seem like one more area which can be easily handled if
the need arises in practice. The mental state of the student may
be: I know I cannot represent opposing sides; I know I cannot tell
my client's secrets; I am a good person; what else is there but dull
rules on commingling trust accounts or putting an accountant on
the firm's letterhead or allowing a paralegal to go to court? Certainly, a wealth of detail exists presenting ethical problems which
the student cannot imagine which, if the student is unable to perceive in practice, will cause trouble. In fact, certain situations exist
where goodness or human charity, if practiced, will result in an
ethical violation under our rules. For educating the young lawyer
for confrontations where his simple goodness is not enough, the
lawyer-like approach to education in Professional Responsibility in
part is worthwhile.
Elliston and Davis, two philosophers by trade, have put together
a compilation of articles and problems to challenge both the cold
approach of a purely code course and the natural lethargy of the
tired student's mind. Their title, Ethics and the Legal Profession,
indicates their perspective; think about Ethics first and then apply
those notions to the Law. The result is a set of provocative and
sophisticated but accessible readings which go beyond code compliance and reach the fundamental ethical question of being a good
lawyer and a lawyer who is good.
Lawyers have acquired for the practice of law the complimentary
term, profession. A profession is a learned art, imparted with some
ritual solemnity and not without difficulty; to be competent with
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its tools, it requires of you much time; it has an organization of
acolytes to some higher good who govern admission and standards
of the practice of the art; this higher goal, its primary duty and
reason for being, as an institutional whole, is the public good. In
fact, absent this latter amorphous notion, there would be no other
justification for self-governance other than that the arts are too
mysterious to be guided by the unpracticed. Given, too, as part of
honored profession status, is that the law the lawyers preach is on
the whole likewise good.
Lawyers have had handed to them, explicitly by schools, implicitly through the traditions they experience in practice, a way of
operating, of performing their function which, in the imparted wisdom, is for the public good. Among the tests a practitioner must
meet are acting as an advocate, acting as an adversary, avoiding
conflicts of interest between clients and between the clients and
himself, and aiding all who wish it in the ability to have legal representation. Elliston and Davis's essayists examine the standard
responses to these events; that is, common legal ethics require this
result; is this result for the public good? If the text merely went to
challenge standard ethical responses and their effectiveness in
achieving the articulated goals, its contribution would not be significant. The failures of the adversary system in achieving truth,
justice, and efficiency are documented elsewhere as they are again
here. That advocacy, blind and singleminded, can result in activity
contrary to your clients' interest, delays, anger, alienation, time,
lost money, misery, and pain are illustrated again. To me the value
of this book is that its authors have taken care to emphasize the
human toll such professional ethics take on the lawyer himself. For
often, the ethics of professional responsibility, the ideology of the
law, alienate the lawyer from his own personal ethics and often
require him to act in a way in which he, if acting for himself, would
consider wrong or bad.
As suggested above, questioning whether the professionalism itself causes evil to occur because personal ethics are drummed out
of the initiate (for example, in his judgment whether to represent a
client or in the manner of the representation) can lead to radical
ideas generally not parcel of the common approach to Professional
Responsibility. Wasserstrom's Lawyers as Professionals: Some
Moral Issues reviews the moral dissonance created by role-differentiated behavior, acting like a lawyer detached from what you
would do as a human being, and suggests that the distance between lawyer and client should be minimized by deprofessionaliz-
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ing the law. Simplify the language, simplify the rules, and perhaps
client and lawyer would interact more humanely.
The advocacy system is not only reviewed from the achievement
of its articulated objectives but from its human costs, disaffection
of clients, amoral behavior by lawyers and resultant unethical (in
human terms) conduct. The young lawyer may be amazed to read
the seminal defense of the advocacy method of the legal profession
advanced in Fuller and Randall's ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference Committee. Advocacy, devotion to a
client, is there argued as the only appropriate method to find truth
given human frailties. Fuller and Randall argue that a judge could
not be counted on to reach the truth himself because, as a human
must, when first presented with the case, he would form an opinion. Any further information would be bent by the judge to fit to
the first-formed theory or would be discarded. Man, even a judge,
can only handle so much, before cognitive dissonance sets in; advocates are needed to keep his mind clear and open to the truth. As
the more cynical might suspect, the truth often makes no appearance in reality even though tenacious advocates tug toward the
great ideal center. Byrne's The Adversary System: Who Needs It?
illustrates that lawyers do not use the adversary system to create
truth or justice. Simon's The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural
Justice and ProfessionalEthics argues that a greater human toll is
taken by adoption of this old ideology because the lawyer must
abandon his personal ethics to embrace it. All the legal profession
as structured provides is some hollow procedural fairness, not some
actual good.
These views are not left undebated in the text and are not recommended for swallowing whole. Leavening, seasoning, and digestion are required. Nonetheless, the student and the lawyer should
at least chew over whether certain of our cultish practices do contribute to John Dean-like behavior: cover-up of illegal activity;
shameless devotion to a corrupt client's interests; a willingness to
send the client over if you yourself are caught. Here is an opportunity to go beyond ethics of the profession as they are frostily
handed down as divine confections.
Perhaps, however, separate from, or systemic with, problems
with the profession as a whole, the real Watergate problem was
that bad people became lawyers. No amount of radical alteration
or sagacious tinkering about what lawyers do, save for the elimination of the species (a proposition which could be rationally supported) will prevent swift thinkers with black hearts from practic-
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ing law. Bars test ethics and require some representation that their
licensees be of good moral character. Passing such tests and
presenting such certificates of merit do not insure the public that
the licensed practitioner will serve the public good. Are the responses of legal education and the bar examiners the best that we,
as a profession, can do?
Elliston asks in The Ethics of Ethics Test for Lawyers, whose
ethics set the standard? Is the lawyer tested for his adherence to
the ethics of the bar, the community, or some greater notion of
objective responsibility? If the purpose of professionalism is to
protect the public, should we not adhere to public morals? But, in
our achievement of this goal, lawyers often do things moral people
would not, that usual litany of horribles, defending the child molester, foreclosing on the widow, using a technical defense to crimes
or debts.
(A chilling thought may be here injected that the moral public
may be finding the horribles less horrible. Lawyers must know that
the law provides for minimum standards of conduct and does not
require of the citizen, the good. When a society has no other ethical standards save legal ones, the moral health of that society must
be at a very low ebb. There is not much to commend in a society
when the courts become the final moral arbiter. The law is ill
equipped to handle such functions; the law tends toward the lowest morals. Theoretically, a morally healthy society resolves moral
issues through human interaction and charity rather than resort to
a court-like decision maker with, by definition, a standard of minimal conduct. In a morally unhealthy society, I suppose we must
have morally bankrupt lawyers. Let us assume that our society has
not reached such a point that we cannot still find honest people to
be honest lawyers.)
Obviously, bar testing of ethics is, in any case, inadequate to
achieve a response to this post-Watergate cry: how can we make
lawyers better people? Elliston recommends, at least, a social audit, a peer review conducted at intervals during practice, if
mandatory pro bono work is viewed as unfair or unworkable. A
sort of regular confession would occur wherein, like priests receiving absolution from priests, the lawyer tells his Confessor the good
he has done or the sins he has committed and is given a Penance
of works to perform, tailored to the moral needs. The soul of the
profession might improve if its souls were routinely searched.
Nonetheless, the search for the public good is the objective. The
real issue for the advance of the profession is where are the lawyers
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who act pro bono publico without the stick of a continuing licensing requirement?
Much of the human misery caused by the law, to lawyers and
their clients, develops from the interpersonal relationship between
us structured by this notion of professionalism. Lawyers can represent people who are inimical to their personal ethics only
through creation of an imposed feeling of detachment. I treat this
person as a case, I am advocate for a cause. Mine is not to influence this person for good but to serve him and so serving him (and
all who come to me and those like me) the world is served for good.
Part of this detachment comes from the grim reality that the law
is complicated and requires aptitude and study. This cause I represent, this action (not this person), requires my guidance. Because of this, lawyers impose structures and ways of doing things
on clients that they would not have employed for themselves. Do
not accommodate, do not negotiate, says the lawyer, we have the
upper hand. He was my friend, says the client. Or, settle, says the
lawyer, you cannot tell with a jury. But, I wish to fight on principle, says the client.
The issue is how much of yourself, your humanity, you should
inject into your dealings with your fellows and with a client. This
text offers an intelligently argued surge of responses. Some argue
that a lawyer's personal morality, if interjected, will lead to enhancement of the public good and, certainly, fewer maladjusted
lawyers. Some argue that the law itself is too complex, should be
deprofessionalized to reduce this human gap between lawyer and
client. Still others argue that, in most cases, if your moral intervention may not prevent an evil from occurring it makes no difference
whether or not you intervene. Certainly, however, regardless of
point of view or perception, one must admit that discussion of the
responsibility of the lawyer as a human being must be central to
the development of any meaningful response to the deluge Watergate. Lawyers can craft rules of ethics and inculcate them in the
young. Mere rules of ethics, however, cannot make the law itself
less susceptible to creating an atmosphere of loss and alienation
among lawyers and clients. More rules do not an ethical lawyer
make or attract good people to our profession or keep the good
people that have chosen this life. This book offers thought and
sensitivity to these issues which heartens the old lawyer and might
enlighten the new one.

